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Roadblocks to Citizenship: Selection Effects of Restrictive 
Naturalisation Rules 
With rising requirements for citizenship across Western Europe, Denmark is one 
of the restrictive 'leaders,' with tough rules for language ability, economic self-
support, and a clean criminal record. But what do these restrictions mean for 
newcomers' ability to qualify, and how does this differ between different types of 
immigrants? Using register data on refugees and family migrants who 
immigrated to Denmark between 2001 and 2009, we show that tough language 
requirements exclude more people than self-support and crime rules, and many 
cannot qualify even after 13 years in the country. Across groups, education level 
at entry is the biggest predictor of whether and when newcomers qualify. These 
findings raise questions about the liberal nature of such requirements and about 
the future of democratic inclusion in Western Europe. 
Keywords: citizenship; naturalisation; refugees; family migrants; civic 
integration; exclusion 
 
Introduction 
For some immigrants in some countries, becoming a citizen is a matter of choice. After 
a certain period of residence, the propensity to naturalise reflects interests and motives, 
pros and cons, depending on such factors as national origin, age, attachment to host or 
home country, and advantages of citizenship over permanent residence. For other 
immigrants, in many countries, naturalisation requirements are so difficult that the 
desire to get citizenship may be frustrated. Increasingly, naturalisation is a function of 
not only immigrants’ motives and interests in, or the desirability of, full citizenship, but 
also of their very ability to overcome the constraints or barriers that arise from 
conditioning naturalisation on fulfilling certain integration requirements (Goodman 
2014; Howard 2009).  
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Whereas previous literature has been mainly concerned with naturalisation 
propensity, explaining it as an outcome of individual motives and interests shaped by 
cultural, psychological and material factors, a few authors have examined the impact of 
institutions and policy - either absence of positive institutional support (Bloemraad 
2002, 2006), or more recently the obstacle of naturalization requirements (Anil 2007; 
Dronkers and Vink 2012; Peters et al. 2016; Vink et al. 2013). In line with this 
literature, this article, which uses unique Danish registry data, investigates how different 
civic integration requirements tied to citizenship acquisition affect which immigrants 
qualify for naturalisation. How do restrictive versions of different requirements 
determine the capacity of immigrants to officially join the nation and attain the full set 
of basic rights?  
For liberals like John Locke or John Rawls, because basic rights reflect 
fundamental interests of individuals, persons living under the same institutional order 
ought to have the same package of basic rights regardless of backgrounds, natural 
talents, or skills (cf. Rawls’ (1999, 220) first principle of justice). They should be able 
to enjoy them, if not unconditionally, then at least subject only to meeting certain fair 
civic obligations according to individual ability and reasonable effort with exemptions 
for the old and infirm.  
A different strand of liberals emphasise equal opportunities in a meritocratic 
system, sensitive to effort and personal choice. It is not intuitively evident, e.g., from a 
luck egalitarian perspective, that access to citizenship should be viewed on a par with 
fair competition (by potential migrants) for a limited pool of green cards, or merit based 
access (by citizens) to desirable universities, or shares of income (but see Joppke 2008: 
34-35). To enjoy citizenship – in the country, which a person has already entered and he 
or she has permanent residence – is arguably more akin to basic civil and political rights 
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(Walzer 1983). Nevertheless, some might argue that citizenship is indeed a meritocratic 
status, like an office, which requires skills (i.e., qualifications to vote), or a distinction, 
which must be deserved (see e.g. Hampshire 2011). Alternatively, it may be a 
forfeitable right, sensitive to reckless life choices. Such intuitions would still imply that 
the merit required – the acquired competence or the demonstrated worth – be 
appropriate to the status at hand, but also that a realistic road towards it, including a fair 
chance to earn it by effort and training, should remain open to all.   
Yet to attain all the basic rights that natives already enjoy, particularly political 
rights and security from deportation, immigrants must go through a process of 
naturalisation whose positive outcome is uncertain and in some cases beyond their 
capacity to influence. This raises the question about how liberal naturalisation 
requirements are in practice.  
In West European politics, the notion that the full rights of citizenship ought to 
be for ‘quality immigrants’ only increasingly prevails (see e.g. the comparative case 
studies by Joppke 2007; Goodman 2014; Mouritsen 2013; van Houdt et al. 2011). Here 
citizenship requires ability to fulfil desirable functions, which again presupposes certain 
motivational dispositions, competences, and a proven record of accomplishment. The 
variety of requirements for citizenship acquisition in the West reflect this. They include 
– besides length of residence – language and knowledge courses and tests, employment 
and self-support, absence of criminal records, and, more symbolically, declarations and 
loyalty oaths. Each requirement taps predicates of good citizenship, which states use 
policy to incentivize integration toward, reward, or select according to – or simply to 
signal the importance of, to immigrants and majority populations alike. Previous critical 
discussions have focused on the arguably illiberal nature of knowledge tests, 
particularly if they contain historical and cultural elements suggesting ascriptive, ethno-
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cultural membership criteria (Bauböck and Joppke 2010; Michalowski 2011), and 
loyalty oaths, which target people’s private feelings and attitudes rather than their 
conduct (Orgad 2014). However, the other requirements – economic self-support, 
language ability, and even a clean criminal record – may, as we show in this article, be 
not only consequential in terms of actual exclusionary effect, but also, depending on 
their harshness, less attainable by reasonable individual effort than proclaiming one’s 
allegiance or even memorizing the contents of a textbook.      
We examine the exclusionary effect of these three types of requirements looking 
at the case of Denmark, which has one of the most restrictive naturalisation regimes in 
Europe. Using Denmark’s longitudinal registry data allows us to establish the effect of 
specific requirements on the naturalisation capacity – the actual ability to naturalise 
irrespective of the individual wish to do so – and to track the impact of years of stay, 
age at entry, gender, educational background and region of origin. We focus on those 
refugees and family migrants who arrived between 2001 and 2009. The data allow us to 
say something substantial and novel about how many, and which groups, a very 
restrictive regime de facto excludes – and by which policies. 
In the following section, we describe the Danish naturalisation requirements 
under study and situate them in relation to other European countries. Section 3 provides 
a brief discussion of the literature on determinants of citizenship acquisition, and we 
derive expectations about which groups are likely to be able to naturalise in a restrictive 
citizenship acquisition regime. Section 4 explains our data and method. Sections 5 and 6 
present the results and details the exclusionary effects of the Danish requirements. The 
final section discusses these results, reflects on whether the various criteria constitute a 
discriminating structural barrier, and discuss the implications for democratic inclusion.  
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The Danish Integration Requirements in Context 
Ascriptive naturalisation requirements such as bloodline or ethnicity per definition 
exclude immigrants with the 'wrong' family origin. However, almost any type of civic 
integration requirement - when made very demanding - can function as an exclusionary 
barrier that places citizenship beyond reach of many immigrants. In this paper, we focus 
on three types of integration requirements regarding language, economic self-support, 
and non-criminality, in part because of data limitations but also because they are, 
arguably, less attainable by individual effort than knowledge tests and oaths and, hence, 
more exclusionary.  
First, reaching high levels of language proficiency is not just a question of 
motivation and hard work. The ability to learn a new language differs with people's 
education level and generally diminish with age. It can be enhanced by offering free 
language courses to meet the required level and promoted by mandatory requirements to 
participate as part of integration programs, as is the case in Denmark for refugees and 
family migrants. But there is a threshold beyond which acquiring strong second 
language competences is about ability and not just motivation and opportunities. 
Second, a similar problem applies to economic self-support: whether you are able to 
support yourself and your family or not depends in part on your employability given 
specific and changing economic circumstances and concretely on the (hiring and 
purchasing) decisions of others. Third, while people in principle have full control over 
whether to commit a crime or not, very strict rules on criminal records can have severe 
consequences for people who are not involved in deliberate criminal activity and, say, 
have been fined for ‘mistakes’ or ‘everyday transgressions’ that many people are likely 
to make.  
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Western European countries have generally moved towards conditioning 
naturalisation on fulfilling more demanding civic integration (language and knowledge 
tests) and economic requirements (application fees and economic self-support) (see 
Goodman 2014; Howard 2009; and Stadlmaier 2018).1 Figure 1, based on the CITLAW 
2016 ordinary naturalisation index describing the overall restrictiveness of ordinary 
naturalisation rules, demonstrates that Denmark has some of the continent’s strictest 
civic integration requirements (restrictive rules produce lower scores). Denmark – along 
with Austria, Switzerland, France and the Czech Republic – has the lowest contribution 
to the overall score from requirements regarding language, self-support, non-
criminality, and knowledge.  
However, Denmark has the most demanding language requirement of these five 
countries2 while permanent exclusion from citizenship requires a longer crime carrying 
sentence in Denmark (minimum one and a half years) than in the other four countries. 
In fact, it is only the non-criminality requirement which contributes positively to the 
Danish score. Note that while CITLAW scores countries according to what criminal 
record permanently excludes immigrants from naturalising, this study also includes the 
minimal crime that have consequences for naturalisation. 
                                                 
1 To our knowledge, there are no systematic studies of requirements regarding crime. 
2 In comparison, Switzerland and France require a B1 level test (only spoken in Switzerland) 
while Austria requires a B2 level test if applying between six and ten years of residence (B1 
after ten years of residence).  
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FIGURE 1. CITLAW 2016 SCORE FOR ORDINARY NATURALIZATION 
SOURCE: Global Citizenship Observatory. NOTE: The six indicators of the index is weighted 
accordingly: residence (20 per cent), dual citizenship/renunciation (40 per cent), language (10 
per cent), self-support (10 per cent), non-criminality (10 per cent) and knowledge (10 per cent). 
Note: the Danish CITLAW score is adjusted to reflect the 2016 law changes. Other country scores 
where double-checked using Saurer (2017), Stadlmair (2018), and government websites resulting 
in few changes. 
The Danish rules of 2016 are similar those that took effect in 2008 (the language 
requirement was introduced already in 2005; see Jensen 2016, 22) and continue to 
condition citizenship today (although they were briefly relaxed between mid-2013 and 
late 2015 by a centre-left government). The following describe the three Danish 
requirements this study examines.   
First, would-be citizens must pass a rather academic language test (written and 
spoken) at level B2 (CEFR) - unless they have been economically self-sufficient in 
eight and a half years out of the last nine, then B1 suffices. Second, in terms of 
economic self-support, immigrants must not have received welfare benefits for more 
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than six months in the last five years3 and not within the last year. Third, a fine as low 
as 400 euros (3000 DKK), which are issued for things like speeding, prohibits applying 
for Danish citizenship for four and a half years from the time of the crime while 
permanent exclusion from naturalization follows a prison sentence of one and a half 
year or more. 
The CITLAW index along with comparative studies (particularly Goodman 
2014 and Howard 2009) demonstrate that Denmark has not only followed the West 
European restrictive trend but leads it along with a small group of countries. Studying 
how Danish naturalisation rules affect immigrants with different naturalisation capacity 
gives us an idea of the likely exclusionary effect of such requirements in general. 
To naturalize you must qualify: likely determinants of qualification 
Why do migrants naturalise, and why is it that some do not? Much of the literature has 
focused on the interest of different individuals in deciding to naturalise. Naturalisation 
propensity here depends on individual level aspects (e.g. age, education, marital status, 
length of residence), but also country level factors in the origin country (e.g. level of 
economic development, conflict and security, and dual citizenship rules) and destination 
country (e.g. level of economic development and type of welfare state) (e.g., Anil 2007; 
Helgertz and Bevelander 2017; Peters et al. 2016; Yang 1994). Where immigrants come 
from and are going influence the cost-benefit calculation of likely rewards and hazards. 
In addition, factors such as cultural closeness and belonging – as a correlate of sending 
country characteristics, level of integration, internal immigrant group sanctioning, and 
perceived discrimination in the receiving country – may psychologically motivate 
                                                 
3 The government is currently planning to tighten this to 4 years and 9 months out of the last 
five years. 
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people to naturalise, or discourage them from doing so (Carillo 2015; Diehl and Blohm 
2003; Hochman 2011).   
Another, less voluminous, part of the literature examines the impact of 
institutional constraints on naturalisation, including more restrictive integration 
requirements. This literature goes beyond interests and motivation to highlight which 
immigrants find it very difficult, or impossible, to naturalise. For instance, Stadlmair 
(2017) finds, using aggregate data, that economic requirements such as economic self-
support or an income threshold have a negative effect on naturalisation rates, while the 
same does not apply to civic integration requirements (cultural knowledge or language), 
naturalisation fees, or ‘procedural security’ in the application process. 
A comprehensive article by Dronkers and Vink (2012), which includes 
comparative microdata on characteristics of individual immigrants, indicates that the 
demandingness of integration requirements, while somewhat significant for the 
naturalisation rate among first-generation immigrants’ naturalisation, do not explain so 
much variation as contextual factors. Whether sending countries are politically unstable, 
poor, and outside the EU matters the most. Another study by Vink et al. (2013) 
emphasizes the differences in restrictive regimes' effects on immigrants of different 
backgrounds, finding that non-Westerners were twice as unlikely to become naturalised 
in restrictive countries (but where restrictiveness matters little for Westerners). Finally, 
a recent study, by Peters et al. (2016) is unique in using individual level longitudinal 
data from municipal registers in a country where conditions have been significantly 
tightened (the Netherlands). It confirms that immigrants in fact are significantly 
impeded in their naturalisation by a restrictive change, and that such change is felt the 
most by those who have the most to gain (or loose) - i.e., those who come from less 
developed and less secure regions of the world.  
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Our paper picks up from this recent, sophisticated contribution, adding a 
similarly longitudinal, micro-level investigation. However, unlike the Dutch study, we 
look at the selection effect of specific integration requirements for different groups and 
categories, not on naturalisation propensity, but on the ability to meet citizenship 
requirements at all, or what we term naturalisation capacity. This involves a shift in 
focus away from variation in naturalisation ambitions and opportunity structures, 
towards variation in types, combinations, and degrees of restrictiveness of naturalisation 
barriers. 
In fact, whether a group of immigrants is more prone to naturalise (naturalisation 
propensity) does not tell us anything per se about how the naturalisation capacity of this 
group is affected by changing integration requirements. Nor which kind of requirements 
are most consequential. Certain groups - for example refugees from less developed 
countries, or women from these countries more particularly - may have a harder time 
qualifying for citizenship, but are more likely to choose to naturalise if they do. There 
might thus be significant differences between group determinants of naturalisation 
capacity that do not appear in analyses of propensity alone. Of course, interest in 
naturalisation might also affect the motivation to fulfil the requirements, making it 
difficult to disentangle ability from interest in a study such as this. Refugees, given the 
situation in their home country, are likely to value the security that citizenship brings 
more highly than family migrants from more secure, wealthy regions of the world. 
However, by far the most immigrants have an interest in learning the language, getting a 
job, and being law-abiding that go beyond naturalisation and have to do with personal 
ambition, identity and family. Thus, we should expect most immigrants to wish, either 
indirectly or directly, to fulfil the requirements examined in this study. 
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Looking at the likely predictors of citizenship eligibility, we expect a clear 
pattern whereby the effect of naturalisation requirements is conditioned by individual 
level factors, such that those with higher education will be significantly more likely to 
meet all three criteria (cf. Vink et al. 2013).  As refugees and family migrants from 
refugee countries typically arrive with less education, on average, than OECD family 
migrants, we expect that the former will take longer, and be less likely to, meet all three 
requirements. However, the caveat to the language exam requirement, whereby a long 
period of employment reduces the language requirement to the B1 level, may mitigate 
the effect of education on the ability to meet that criterion. Second, we expect that 
individuals with a higher age at the time of immigration will be less likely to meet the 
language requirement, as language learning capacity typically declines with age (Flege 
et al. 1999; Piske et al. 2001; Hakuta et al. 2003). Third, length of stay is likely to affect 
positively the ability to meet the employment requirement because immigrants have had 
more time to adjust to the demands of the labour market. Fourth, we expect female 
refugees and female family migrants from non-OECD countries to be less likely to meet 
the language and self-support requirements than their male counterparts because 
traditional family roles produce fewer opportunities to learn the language and take a job 
(Liversage 2009). Finally, we expect that women across groups will be less negatively 
affected by the criminal record requirement, as women are in general are far less likely 
to have been convicted of serious crimes than men (Walklate 2004). 
Data and operationalisation 
This study uses Danish registry data provided by Statistics Denmark. The data set 
covers all refugees and family migrants who arrived as adults (18 or older) between 
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2001 and 2009.4 The data set is longitudinal and contains individual data on each year 
from the year of arrival until 2014. We limit the analyses to those who arrived between 
2001 and 2009 for two reasons. First, the Danish register data from before 2001 is 
lacking (see below). Second, only data up until 2014 was available and only immigrants 
with at least five years of residence are relevant since that is minimally required to 
accommodate the Danish self-sufficiency requirement. 
From 2001 to 2009, approximately 56,000 refugees and family migrants 
received stay in Denmark of which around 15,000 were under 18. Among the adult 
migrants, 11,889 persons lack data for one or more years and are therefore excluded 
from the analysis. Of these, 9,653 are missing data on language program participation. 
Across migrant groups we see the same pattern; those who arrived in 2001 have 
between 40 to 44 per cent missing registrations on language program participation, 
those who arrived 2002 have between 20 to 25 missing registrations, while the number 
of missing registrations stay below 6 per cent from 2004 and onwards. This similar 
pattern indicate that the missing registrations are largely randomly distributed, although 
comparing immigrants with and without data on language program participation shows 
that those without registrations in 2001 and 2002 were slightly more able to meet the 
self-support requirement 5 and 10 years after arrival. 
The analyses divides immigrants into three groups: refugees, family migrants 
from non-OECD countries and OECD family migrants5. These three groups are 
                                                 
4 See tables A1-A3 in the supplemental online material for descriptive statistics. 
5 The OECD countries are accordingly: the EU 27, Norway and Switzerland (denoted the EU in 
the analysis); Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States (English-speaking 
OECD); Turkey (Turkey); and Chile, Israel, Japan and South Korea (other OECD). 
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analysed separately since there are qualitative differences between their respective 
migration experiences that do not allow us to assume that integration requirements 
affect the three groups equally or similarly.  
To enable the analyses, we constructed dichotomous variables for each 
requirement for each year with the score 1 if the requirement is fulfilled, 0 if it is not. 
Similarly, we constructed a variable for each year scored 1 if all three requirements 
were fulfilled simultaneously in that year, and 0 if they were not. 
The language requirement is fulfilled in a given year if the immigrant in 
question has passed a Danish exam on the B2 level (the so-called Dansk 3 exam) in that 
year or in any of the previous years, or if the immigrant has passed an exam on the B1 
level (the Dansk 2 exam) and have been self-supporting for eight and a half of the 
previous nine years. Our data shows the highest Danish exam passed by 2014 and the 
year of this exam. Although refugees and family migrants are required to participate 
actively in language training (see below), they are not required to take a language test. 
The language requirement is also fulfilled by obtaining a Danish language higher 
education degree.6 However, enrolment in itself requires certified Danish language 
competences at the C1 level. 
In order to evaluate the self-support requirement, we divide the amount of the 
relevant unemployment benefits a person has received in a given year with the benefit 
                                                 
6 A high school degree may also substitute a Dansk 3 exam. However, this is irrelevant for adult 
migrants since they cannot be enrolled in a Danish high school without having a Danish 
lower secondary school degree. 
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levels for that year.7 This number tells us the proportion of the year that the immigrant 
has received those unemployment benefits. It allows us to calculate whether the 
immigrant in a given year has received more than six months of the relevant 
unemployment benefits within the last five years or within the last year, thereby 
excluding the immigrant from naturalisation.  
The non-criminality requirement is fulfilled in a given year if the immigrant has 
not received a fine above 3000kr (400 euros) within the last four years,8 a conditional 
prison sentence within the last six years, or an unconditional prison sentence within the 
last 12 years.9 
Regarding the independent variables, age at entry, gender, and region of origin 
are measured directly. Data on immigrants’ home country education is generally lacking 
in Danish administrative registers. However, we can obtain a good estimate using the 
language program refugees and family migrants enrol in initially. There are three 
different programs; each tailored differently according to the educational level of 
immigrants. The Law on Danish Education for Adult Foreigners (2017, § 3) specify 
                                                 
7 We only look at the main unemployment benefits that can exclude immigrants from 
naturalisation. That is kontanthjælp (the normal kind of unemployment benefit for those not 
covered by an unemployment insurance fund) and integrationsydelse (an unemployment 
benefit for those who have not resided more than a year in Denmark within the last seven 
years and who are not covered by an unemployment insurance fund). 
8 We only know the year in which the fine or sentence was received. Hence, we cannot model a 
four and a half years period of additional waiting.  
9 This is a simplified version of the Danish rules, which involves more progression. However, a 
more detailed modelling of the rules is irrelevant because we do not look beyond 13 years of 
residence. 
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prior education and the expected learning pace as the main criteria for allocating 
immigrants between the three courses. Those beginning on Danish Course 1 have little 
or no schooling before immigration or difficulties reading and writing in their mother 
tongue; those in Danish Course 2 have a short to intermediate level of education and are 
expected to learn Danish rather slowly; while those placed in Danish Course 3 have an 
upper secondary or higher educational background from their country of origin and are 
expected to learn Danish more rapidly. Danish course 1 is successfully completed when 
one passes the Danish 1 exam (A2 level), the Danish course 2 ends with the Danish 2 
exam (B1 level), while the Danish Course 3 ends with the Danish 3 exam (B2 level). In 
the period under study, refugees and family migrants could receive up to three years of 
free language training. Immigrants themselves or municipalities may choose to pay for 
additional lessons and/or exams (an exam costs approximately 180 euros) after the first 
three years. An exam can be taken at any point. 
Initial course placement is a good proxy for educational level because it has 
been mandatory for all refugees and family migrants to participate since 2003 until June 
201910 (from 1998 to 2003 it was mandatory if you received unemployment benefits) as 
part of their individual integration contract with the municipality,11 and they cannot 
themselves choose the course in which to enrol. Instead, the municipality enrols 
refugees and family migrants in the appropriate course after individual screening 
processes to determine prior education and learning capacity. Still, because the 
                                                 
10 From 1 June 2019 participation in a language program is only mandatory for refugees and 
family migrants united with a refugee. 
11 Not fulfilling this contract may lead to economic sanctions and being denied permanent 
residence. 
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screening process leaves some discretion to the individual caseworker, it can only serve 
as a proxy. No qualitative studies exist on the biases that this screening process might 
involve. 
The following sections proceeds by first analysing how many years of residence 
it generally takes for immigrants to reach a point where they can accommodate all three 
requirements simultaneously (using the Kaplan-Meier estimator and proportional 
hazards regression) and to which extent this is affected by age at entry, gender, 
educational level at entry and region of origin. Secondly, the analysis investigates who 
can satisfy the requirements separately, using logistic regression to see whether the 
same factors as above, but also years of stay, correlate with immigrants’ ability to fulfil 
a given requirement in 2014. 
Who can fulfil the language, self-support and non-criminality requirements 
simultaneously? 
Table 1 below describes the percentage of the included adult refugees, family migrants 
from non-OECD countries, and family migrants from OECD countries able to fulfil the 
naturalisation requirements regarding non-criminality, self-support and language as of 
2014. For all three groups, the language requirement appear the most difficult to fulfil. 
Just above one-fourth of the refugees can fulfil it and it only rises to 41.8 and 44.3 per 
cent, respectively, among family migrants, despite the much higher educational level 
among family migrants (see tables A1-A3 in the supplemental online material for 
descriptive statistics). Refugees generally have a harder time accommodating all three 
requirements, separately and simultaneously. By 2014, only 19.5 per cent of refugees 
could satisfy all three requirements. For family migrants the numbers are roughly twice 
that. Besides educational level, the main differences between refugees and the two 
family migrant groups is the gender composition, with mostly men among refugees 
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(64.7 per cent) and mostly women among the family migrants (80.6 and 59.5 per cent 
for non-OECD and OECD family migrants, respectively). However, among non-OECD 
family migrants, those from Eastern Europe and Central/South America are 
significantly better educated. Similarly, among OECD family migrants, those from 
Turkey have received much less education. In addition, OECD family migrants are 
younger at entry than the two other groups. 
TABLE 1. ADULT REFUGEES AND FAMILY MIGRANTS TO DENMARK GRANTED STAY BETWEEN 
2001 AND 2009 WHO FULFIL THE DANISH LANGUAGE, SELF-SUPPORT AND NON-CRIMINALITY 
REQUIREMENTS, SEPARATELY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY, AS OF 2014. IN PER CENT. 
 N Non-criminality Self-support Language All three 
Refugees 7,557 91.1 53.1 27.4 19.5 
Family migrants, non-OECD 16,336 96.8 82.7 41.8 38.8 
Family migrants, OECD 4,252 94.7 90.3 44.3 40.9 
Total 28,923 94.9 75.9 38.3 34.0 
SOURCE: Danish Statistics 
Figure 1 below uses Kaplan-Meier curves to show the years it took the immigrants 
under study to reach a point where they could fulfil all three requirements 
simultaneously.12 Without controlling for covariates, the figure shows that the 
difference between the ability of the three groups to satisfy the three requirements is 
quite constant. In Denmark, naturalisation requires six years of residence if married to a 
Danish spouse, eight years of residence for refugees, and nine years of residence for 
others.13 Still, after nine years in the country, the Kaplan-Meier estimator predicts that 
just above 20 per cent of refugees will have experienced at least one year where they 
can satisfy all three requirements. After 13 years, this number is still short of 40 per 
                                                 
12 In this survival analysis, a person is removed at the first point in time (measured in years) at 
which they can fulfil all three requirements simultaneously. 
13 In fact, naturalisation has to be confirmed by a vote in parliament. Hence, even those meeting 
all requirements could in principle be denied citizenship. 
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cent. Though family migrants fare better, their rates are also low. After 13 years of stay, 
their estimated qualification rates are around 50 to 60 per cent with OECD family 
migrants being slightly more likely to qualify than non-OECD family migrants are. This 
demonstrates the strong exclusionary effect of the Danish naturalisation requirements. 
 
FIGURE 2. KAPLAN-MEIER CURVES SHOWING THE CUMULATIVE RATE AT WHICH ALL THREE 
REQUIREMENTS ARE SATISFIED, BY GROUP. 
The sharp increase in qualification rate from year 8 to year 9 reflects the alternative 
language requirement. If an immigrant has been self-supportive for at least eight and a 
half years within the last nine years, the language requirement changes to an exam at the 
B1 level. It appears that this different route to meeting the language requirement does 
help a significant amount of immigrants to qualify for naturalisation. 
Table 2 shows, for each group, Cox proportional hazard regressions on the risk 
of satisfying the three requirements simultaneously controlling for gender, age at entry, 
education level at entry and region of origin/OECD. Goodness-of-fit tests revealed that 
the impact of age and having a high education changes after 8 years of stay for refugees, 
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while only having a higher education changes impact for the two family migrant 
groups.14 These interactions, which relate to the alternative language requirement, were 
included in the models. 
It is clear and unsurprising that education level at entry makes an enormous 
difference across all three groups. Immigrants with a high level of education are much 
more likely to reach a point where they can meet the three requirements. With the 
controls included in this analysis, having a high compared to a low education makes it 
50.6 times more likely that a refugee could satisfy all three requirements simultaneously 
at some point between 5 and 9 years of residence. It is 61.3 times more likely among 
non-OECD family migrants and 42.1 times more likely among OECD family migrants. 
After 9 years of stay, the effect of having a high education compared to a low level of 
education decreases because of the aforementioned alternative language requirement. 
Among refugees, those with a high education are now 16.7 times more likely to satisfy 
all three requirements, while the equivalent number is 7.4 among non-OECD family 
migrants and 2.5 among OECD family migrants.  In fact, for both groups of family 
migrants, the difference between having a medium and high level of education is non-
significant at the 0.05 level after nine years of stay. 
  
                                                 
14 Both Kaplan-Meier plots, log-log plots and Schoenfeld residuals showed that these variables 
did not conform to the proportional hazard assumption. 
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TABLE 2. COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS REGRESSION ON THE RISK OF SATISFYING THE 
LANGUAGE, SELF-SUPPORT AND NON-CRIMINALITY REQUIREMENT SIMULTANEOUSLY FROM 
2006-2014 (SEPARATE REGRESSIONS FOR REFUGEES, FAMILY MIGRANTS FROM NON-OECD 
COUNTRIES, AND OECD FAMILY M 
 Refugees Family migrants,  
non-OECD 
Family migrants,  
OECD 
 HR 95% CI HR 95% CI HR 95% CI 
Gender (ref: Female)       
 Male 1.28*** 1.15-1.43 0.86*** 0.81-0.92 0.81*** 0.74-0.90 
Age at entry 0.96*** 0.94-0.97 0.99** 0.99-1.00 0.99* 0.99-1.00 
Education at entry (ref: Low)       
 Medium 7.04*** 5.14-9.67 6.71*** 5.31-7.41 2.98*** 1.80-4.93 
 High 50.6*** 35.3-72.7 61.3*** 50.8-73.9 42.1*** 24.4-72.8 
Region (ref: Eastern Europe) 
 
     
 North Africa and Middle East 1.05 0.91-1.22 0.52*** 0.48-0.56   
 Sub-Saharan Africa 0.98 0.82-1.16 0.68*** 0.62-0.74   
 Central/South Asia 1.24** 1.06-1.45 0.60*** 0.55-0.66   
 East/Southeast Asia 0.63*** 0.48-0.81 0.88*** 0.82-0.94   
 Central/South America 
 
 0.89* 0.81-0.97   
OECD (ref: EU)       
 English-speaking     0.89 0.78-1.03 
 Turkey     0.91 0.79-1.04 
 Other     1.13 0.97-1.31 
Age at entry*years of stay>8 1.03*** 1.01-1.04     
High education*years of stay>8 0.33*** 0.26-0.41 0.12*** 0.10-0.14 0.06*** 0.05-0.08 
N 7,552 16,336 4,252 
Number of qualifications 1,649 6,625 1,845 
Observations (times at risk) 39,876 64,805 15,532 
SOURCE: Danish Statistics; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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This unveils a towering educational barrier to citizenship. A majority of those arriving 
with a low level of education may not ever be able to fulfil the Danish naturalisation 
requirements. However, refugees in particular face other barriers regarding age and 
gender. Older and female refugees generally experience more challenges. Up until 8 
years of stay, the likelihood of a refugee satisfying all three requirements decreases by 4 
per cent per year of age. The age difference reduces after 9 years of stay to 1.1 per cent 
per year of age because of the alternative language requirement. For family migrants 
from both non-OECD and OECD family migrants, there is a much weaker but 
significant negative association with age at entry (around 1 per cent per year of age). 
This increased importance of age among refugees indicates that it is not just a question 
of older immigrants in general being less able to adjust to new circumstances. In 
addition, it might be that the migration process takes a larger toll on older refugees or 
that Danish authorities are less capable of designing integration programs that help 
older refugees. 
Finally, gender makes a difference. Among refugees, men are 28 per cent more 
likely to fulfil the three requirements than women are. The gender difference is reverse 
for family migrants, which contrasts with our hypothesis. Here men are 14 per cent 
(non-OECD family migrants) and 19 per cent (OECD family migrants) less likely to 
meet the three requirements. Consequently, it seems that it is not gender roles per se that 
are important. 
One might object that the regression analysis does not include a measure of 
interest in naturalisation, which may skew the results. Indeed, this could result in 
overestimation of the overall exclusionary effect of integration requirements to the 
extent that low interest reduces motivation to fulfil the requirements (yet, as noted 
earlier, immigrants have many other reasons to pursue the goals in the requirements). 
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However, it does not change the impact of a background factor like education unless we 
argue, counter-intuitively, that those with less education are also less interested in 
citizenship, all else equal. 
Who can fulfil the language, self-support and non-criminality requirements 
separately? 
Turning from the overall picture of who can meet all three requirements simultaneously, 
the following logistic regressions reveal who can fulfil each of the three requirements 
separately. Our analyses show the extent to which the particular requirement affects the 
ability of different groups to reach a point where they can qualify for naturalisation. 
Figures 2, 3 and 4 below display the results of logistic regressions (odds ratios) for the 
three immigrant groups. Figure 2 shows the association between years in country, 
gender, age at entry, educational level at entry and region of origin and whether or not 
immigrants are able to fulfil the language requirement in 2014 (the dependent variable). 
Figure 3 shows the same for the self-support requirement while figure 4 shows the same 
for the non-criminality requirement. 
Starting with the language requirement (figure 3), we see across the three groups 
that being older at the time of immigration has a negative impact. The association is 
particularly strong among refugees, with refugees who were 41 years of age or older 
when they entered Denmark being 60 per cent less likely to pass the required language 
test compared to those who immigrated between the ages of 18 and 30. This 
corresponds to our expectations, based on existing knowledge of the impact of age at 
migration on second-language acquisition. It is equally unsurprising that educational 
level at entry is very strongly associated with the ability to meet the language 
requirement across all three groups, but the differences are stark: people who entered 
the country with a relatively high educational level are between 5.7 times (refugees) and 
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6.5 (non-OECD family migrants) times more likely to fulfil the requirements than those 
with a medium educational level. Indeed, from these estimates it is clear that very few 
immigrants with little prior education appear able to fulfil the requirement. However, 
we cannot tell from this analysis whether this only reflects personal ability. For 
example, it could be that the quality of teaching that immigrants receive differs between 
the language courses. 
We did not expect, however, that men among refugees are 30 per cent more 
likely to fulfil the language requirement in 2014, while they are 20 per cent less likely 
among family migrants. Yet, if we run the same analysis without the possibility of the 
alternative language requirement, we see that the gender difference becomes 
insignificant among refugees. Hence, the higher employment rate among refugee men 
renders them more likely to meet the alternative language requirement. 
Among OECD family migrants, we observe that those from Turkey are 30 per 
cent less likely to fulfil the language requirement than EU family migrants. However, 
many of those Turks who qualify do so after 9 years of residence, when they only need 
to fulfil the alternative language requirement.15  
                                                 
15 See figure A4 in the supplemental online material. 
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FIGURE 3. FACTORS FOR MEETING THE LANGUAGE REQUIREMENT IN 2014, BY GROUP. ODDS 
RATIOS ESTIMATED WITH LOGISTIC REGRESSION. 95 PER CENT CONFIDENCE INTERVAL. 
Regarding the self-support requirement (figure 3), we again see a general pattern of 
higher educational levels at entry being highly positively associated with the ability to 
satisfy the self-support requirement. In addition, among refugees and non-OECD family 
migrants, men are 40 and 60 per cent, respectively, more likely than women are to meet 
the requirement in 2014. However, age does not display a clear relationship with the 
ability of refugees or family migrants to meet the self-support requirement. Note, 
however, that for the refugee group older refugees do take longer to become self-
supportive; however, they eventually catch up with younger refugees which is why 
years in country is so strongly correlated with meeting the requirement among refugees. 
Among non-OECD family migrants, people who enter at an older age do, however, 
appear to be less likely to satisfy the requirement.  
Finally, it is worth noting that migrants from East/Southeast Asia are much more 
likely to satisfy the self-support requirement, while they among refugees are 
significantly less likely to fulfil the language requirement. This could indicate, as some 
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US studies argue (Bauder 2006; Sanders et al. 2002), that refugees from East/Southeast 
Asia are more likely to find work through their ethnic networks and therefore less 
dependent on being proficient in Danish. 
 
FIGURE 4. FACTORS FOR MEETING THE SELF-SUPPORT REQUIREMENT IN 2014, BY GROUP. ODDS 
RATIOS ESTIMATED WITH LOGISTIC REGRESSION. 95 PER CENT CONFIDENCE INTERVAL. 
Regarding the non-criminality requirement (figure 4), we see the expected pattern: men 
are 80 to 90 per cent less likely than women are to satisfy this requirement across all 
three groups. Among refugees and non-OECD family migrants age also makes a big 
difference: those who entered at age 41 or older were more than twice as likely to meet 
this requirement compared to those who were young adults at entry. In other words, 
young men are more likely to be convicted of a crime. Moreover, refugees from 
East/Southeast Asia are less likely than the other refugee groups of being convicted of a 
crime. 
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FIGURE 5. FACTORS FOR MEETING THE NON-CRIMINALITY REQUIREMENT IN 2014, BY GROUP. 
ODDS RATIOS ESTIMATED WITH LOGISTIC REGRESSION. 95 PER CENT CONFIDENCE INTERVAL. 
Returning to the educational, gender and age barriers to naturalisation, we now have a 
better understanding of how the language, self-support and non-criminality 
requirements relate to these. The language requirement is the most exclusionary 
requirement of the three and at the same time, education level at entry is most strongly 
associated with this requirement across all groups. Consequently, the language 
requirement constitutes the largest barrier to citizenship. There is also a strong 
association between education and fulfilling the self-support requirement. Hence, this is 
also a significant educational barrier although less effective than the language 
requirement, since it is easier for most to fulfil at some point. 
Similarly, the age and gender barriers for refugees are most strongly linked to 
the language requirement. Older and female refugees have a much harder time 
satisfying the language requirement. Especially for women, the self-support requirement 
also constitutes a barrier. Again, this suggests that reducing the language requirement is 
the most effective way of improving access to citizenship and reduce the impact of age, 
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gender and education among refugees – at least to the extent that additional or higher 
quality language training does not increase chances of meeting the requirement. 
However, for family migrants, only the self-support requirement hinders women more 
than men while lowering the language requirement would reduce the age barrier. 
However, among family migrants, men appear at a disadvantage in terms of fulfilling 
the language requirement. Finally, the non-criminality requirement mostly affects young 
men. However, since most can fulfil this requirement, it does not affect that many. 
As a final observation, we also see that refugees from East/South East Asia have 
a harder time accommodating the language requirement, while they more easily meet the 
self-support and non-criminality requirement. As suggested above, this could indicate 
stronger ethnic network being leveraged in search for employment.  
Discussion and conclusion 
Developments in European naturalisation policy present a mixed picture, where spread 
of ius soli, acceptance of dual citizenship, reduced administrative discretion and, in 
some countries, shorter waiting periods is increasingly overlaid by the proliferation of 
civic integration requirements, which uses naturalisation to optimize the ‘quality’ of 
nations’ citizen pools. When such requirements become very strict, they may exclude 
very large groups of potential applicants.  
Some politicians intend and welcome this development, but insist that failure to 
meet the requirements means that immigrants have not tried hard enough. However, if 
the point of legislation is to not only select and exclude, or appease hostile electorates, 
but also to function as an incentive to integrate, a realistic ‘road towards citizenship’ 
must exist. Some philosophers accept the premise that placing civic conditions on 
citizenship may be acceptable, in light of the fact that also the rights of nationals 
correspond to obligations and desirable virtues (Hampshire 2011). However, Christian 
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Joppke (2008) has argued that integration requirements, if they can be met by personal 
effort and do not touch on the most privately held convictions or Gesinnung, do not 
conflict with liberal principles and may be seen as part of a voluntary contract. 
Working, learning the language, and keeping one’s criminal record clean (as well as 
knowledge tests) in this line of reasoning are voluntarist and non-arbitrary in a way that 
providing privileged access to close ethnic groups or blacklisting undesirable (Muslim) 
countries of origin – so far only practiced by some states at the level of temporary work 
permits – is not. Unlike loyalty oaths and value declarations, they are also strictly 
behavioural. 
However, as demonstrated in this article, ostensibly ‘contractual’ criteria, if 
defined very strictly, may constitute overwhelming obstacles for some groups, who are 
thereby discriminated against. The Danish example highlights the exclusion effect of 
difficult language criteria in particular, but also of self-support requirements, as well as 
a spotless criminal record. It also shows that class differences – for which levels of 
education is a strong indicator – as well as age, gender, and even region very 
significantly affect the very capacity to become a citizen. Naturalization, here, is not a 
matter of immigrants’ desire, willingness or honest effort to contribute and become 
competent citizens. It depends on qualifications and human resources, which some 
people simply are incapable of acquiring.  
From a meritocratic perspective, very strict requirements arguable need to be 
combined with comprehensive supporting structures that provide everybody with a fair 
chance. Indeed, Denmark, along with its Scandinavian neighbours, does offer quite 
comprehensive introductory programs to refugees and family migrants with up to three 
years of free language training and a host of activation measures (Breidahl 2017). 
However, the programs effectively lock low-educated refugees and family migrants into 
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basic training tracks, from where only few progress to the required B2 language level. 
For example, based on the logistic regression presented in figure 3, the predicted 
probability (average marginal effect) that a refugee with little education beginning on 
the Danish course 1 actually fulfils the language requirement within 13 years of 
residence is 2.5 per cent. For the refugees beginning on Danish course 2 that figure is 
19.8 per cent and 56.7 per cent for those starting on Danish course 3 (see tables A1-A3 
in online appendix for full descriptive statistics). Still, one could argue that lowering 
requirements – especially language – would mean giving up on ambitious integration 
efforts. Instead, the state should invest even more in upgrading the skills of immigrants 
so as to not shift discrimination or unequal status towards labour markets with rising 
demands for qualified workers. However, this argument unrealistically assumes that the 
citizenship institution (with even more comprehensive integration programs) could 
incentivize the first generation towards semi-academic language qualifications, which 
might improve their job prospects, but which do not correspond to the educational 
background and human capital most of them have (Strik et al 2010). Indeed, the scarce 
literature on the topic find little integration effect at all of citizenship requirements 
(Goodman & Wright 2015). 
Instead, tough naturalisation barriers, especially very strict language 
requirements, de facto place large numbers of immigrants in a large and growing, 
ethnically segmented class of metics – including many who speak the language 
sufficiently well to participate in society and who have worked and paid tax for long 
periods. This group lives under laws, which they cannot influence by their vote, 
deprived also of the security and civic recognition, which comes with full citizenship.  
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